Window of opportunity

With the imminent retirement of CoAS Katawal, the Army leadership has an opportunity to redefine its role in line with the changed political circumstances
Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) Rookmangud Katawal has had a busy month. Less than two months before his retirement (a month before for voluntary retirement), he appears to be engaged on all fronts: lobbying with the government to allow the Army to recruit, to resume lethal and non-lethal military aid from India and promote favoured generals Toranjung Bahadur Singh and B.A. Sharma. Then there were his tours to barracks across the country, where he gave speeches warning that attempts are being made to destroy Army morale in the name of inclusion, and claiming that nowhere in the peace agreements does it say that Maoist combatants have to be integrated into the national army. And as is widely known, while in Kathmandu, Katawal has been cultivating a wide variety of people — diplomats, journalists, and even ad agencies — and attempting to build up a wide base of support.

So the Army has been more assertive and emboldened than it has previously been during the peace process. Always intolerant of criticism, it has now become more so, willing to react strongly to anyone who, the Army perceives as responsible for defamation of or unnecessary interference in the institution. For example, when the Representative of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Richard Bennett met with Defense Minister Bidhya Bhandari to urge her not to promote Maj. Gen. Toranjung Singh to the position of lieutenant general as he was Brigade Commander of the Bhairabnath and Yuddha Bhairab battalions during the time when 49 people were tortured and disappeared under their custody in 2003. It was reported that Katawal met Bennett to tell him not to unnecessarily interfere in areas out of his mandate. Army Spokesman Ramindra Chhetri issued a statement that said that an internal Army report issued on Oct. 16, 2006, and presented to the Parliamentary Foreign Relations and Human Rights Committee and to OHCHR, had not found the said officer to be complicit in any human rights violations.

The exact nature of the culpability of Nepal Army officers is, in the absence of an independent investigation, difficult to ascertain. But what Chhetri did not mention in his statement was that the Oct. 16 Army report, already suspicious for having been produced by the very institution that was under scrutiny, was rejected by the parliamentary committee to which it was presented. Lawmaker and member of the committee Romi Gauchan was reported at the time as saying, "the report was not trustworthy and there are many contradictions over the facts within the report." Previously, the parliamentary committee had formed a one-member commission under Joint Secretary at the Home Ministry Baman Prasad Neupane to investigate disappearances. But, according to his testimony in July 2006, the Army did not cooperate with him and give him the required information. The committee then ordered the formation of a powerful and independent commission to probe disappearances but this never materialised. Instead, the committee was later informed by then Defence Secretary Bishnu Dutta Uprety that the report produced by the Army would be the final word on the matter.

The Army's attempts to obstruct independent investigations into its conduct during the war arise from its insecurity — which arose after the 2006 Jana Andolan — that all social and political forces are bent on undermining its institutional integrity. With the end of the war and the abolition of the monarchy, the Army faced a crisis of purpose as its traditional worldview collapsed. It felt threatened by ascendance of the Maoists and began to fear the aspects to the peace agreements that mentioned the integration of Maoist combatants and the democratization of the Nepal Army. Integration would lead to a massive influx of undesirables who would subvert the Army from the inside, it was felt, and democratization would leave the institution open to the whims of the political leaders who would subvert and undermine the institution from the outside. And the Army feared the Maoist socio-political agenda. It perceived the widespread demand for inclusive representation of all classes and ethnicities in state institutions including the Army to be a Maoist ploy to raise discontent within the Army ranks and undermine its chain of command.

As it is the Maoists who are largely responsible for all of the changes that have caused such insecurity in the Army, it is immensely difficult for the latter to look upon the Maoists as anything but the enemy, even though it has been over three years since the war ended. The strong rhetoric from the Army regarding Maoist designs to capture the state through military means — rhetoric that far exceeds any evidence regarding Maoist military capabilities or intentions — arises partially because of the Army's need to justify its existence. But there is also a real fear of “state capture”, which arises from the great vulnerability the Army feels regarding the social and political currents that the Maoists have introduced.

It is this vein of insecurity that Katawal tapped as chief of army staff. He felt that in order to prevent the political class from tampering with the Army, he had to take an assertive role. So soon after he became Army chief he began lobbying with politicians, making statements in the media about what politicians could and couldn't do and maintained a vehement stance against integration. In other words, in advocating for a strong Army with its traditional structure, culture and privileges intact, he assumed an openly political role that far surpassed what would be allowed of an Army chief in a democratic country with a military under firm civilian control.

Katawal's actions aroused discomfort among a large section of top Army generals. Trained as they were in doctrines of civilian supremacy, the Army chief's actions seemed improper. They resented and derided his attempts at cultivating his image and felt that many of his actions were geared towards fulfilling his personal ambitions. But they shared with Katawal the belief that the Maoists were bent on undermining their institution, and for this reason they supported his attempts to cultivate constituencies and assert the Army against any attempted political intervention — a process that climaxed with Katawal's political maneuverings to avoid being sacked by the Maoist prime minister.

Almost the entire top Army brass supported Katawal then; they were firm in their belief that the attempt to fire the Army chief was part of the Maoist attempt to take over their institution. But now that the incident is over, old resentments have resurfaced and even increased. In particular, there is uneasiness over Katawal's attempt to have his tenure extended. Although this may not have been directly expressed to Katawal's face, a number of top generals — including those who are often reported by the media to have accompanied the Army chief on his various lobbying visits to politicians — are strongly opposed to an extension of his tenure and have been using their own channels to make their opposition known.

At the moment it appears that despite Katawal's exertions, his tenure as Army chief will not be extended. Once he retires in September, the new Army chief and his advisors can follow one of two paths. First, they can continue to do what Katawal did and assert themselves openly, express their displeasure at the political class, adamantly refuse to undergo any reform and press the politicians in control to expand their budget and perks.

Or, preferably, they can realize that the political changes that have taken place over the past few years are irreversible. That to attempt to strengthen the Army according to its old structure and culture and isolate the Maoists would be to provoke conflict and invite another bout of bloodletting. And having accepted the inevitability of change, they can make efforts to redefine their role and reform their structure according to the roadmap laid down by the peace process agreements.